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Abstract 
This paper considers the private sector wage earners in Egypt and examine their wage distribution during 
1998-2012 using Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey. We first estimate Mincer wage equations both at 
the mean and at different quantiles of the wage distribution taking into account observable characteristics. 
Then we make use of the panel feature of the data and estimate models taking into account unobservable 
characteristics. We also consider the possibility of nonlinearity in covariate effects and estimate a variant 
of matching models. In all cases we find a persistent informal wage penalty in the face of extensive 
sensitivity checks. It is smaller when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account and larger at the top 
than at the bottom of the conditional wage distribution. We also examine the informal wage penalty over 
time during the study period and in different groups according to experience and education. The informal 
wage penalty has increased recently over time and is larger for the better educated but smaller for the 
more experienced.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Informal employment is an important characteristic of developing country labor markets. 
Egypt is not an exception with her quiet large informal sector. In fact, presence of large informal 
sector is one of the main differentiating characteristic of the developed and developing country 
labor markets. Recent estimates provided by Gatti et al. (2014) put the informality rate, measured 
as the percent of labor force not contributing to social security, at 67 percent in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA), 61 percent in Latin America, 39 percent in Europe and Central Asia, 
91 percent in South Asia and 95 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Further, according to the same 
source there has been a rapid increase in informality in the entire developing world.  Perry et al. 
(2007) reported an increase in informality during the 1990s in several Latin American countries. 
Informality may have adverse effects on growth and social well-being meriting its closer 
examination. Understanding the informal sector of employment is crucial for understanding the 
functioning of the labor markets as well as the structure of economic activities. Large informal 
sector has important implications for the efficiency of the allocation of labor. Grasping the 
nature, character and functioning of the informal sector is essential for understanding the income 
inequality, persistent poverty and labor market inefficiencies in these countries. 
 
The concept of informal sector was first introduced by Hart (1971). However, it is only 
during the last two decades more attention is devoted to understanding the informal sector both 
by academicians and the policy makers. Currently, there is a large amount of empirical evidence 
for many developing and transition countries. Loayza (1996) and De Soto (1989) provide a 
detailed characterization of informal labor markets in developing countries. Several definitions 
are used to characterize informal employment. Some studies consider self-employment and 
employment in small or micro firms as informal. However, most frequently, informal 
employment is associated with workers being unregistered, not having a contract, not paying 
taxes, and not subject to labor market regulations such as minimum wage, employment 
protection, unemployment insurance and health and safety regulations and retirement benefits. 
Thus, it is often argued that informal employment is characterized not only by low earnings and 
inferior working conditions but also lack of several fringe benefits. Thus, from a social welfare 
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point of view informal sector is seen as undesirable. However this view is challenged as 
elaborated below.  
 
There are two competing views of the developing country labor markets with large 
informal sector. The traditional view espoused for instance by Fields (1975) and Dickens and 
Lang (1985) implies that the labor market is segmented along formal informal lines and that 
workers enter informal employment in order to escape unemployment because they are rationed 
out of the regulated formal sector. They earn less than the identical workers in the formal sector. 
The presence of trade unions and regulations such as minimum wages and collective bargaining 
and efficiency wage considerations keep formal sector wages above market clearing levels   In 
contrast, more recent writings support the competitive view of the labor market where presence 
of any wage gaps between formal and informal sectors could be attributed to compensating 
differentials prevailing in one sector or the other.  
 
 Rosen (1986) proposed a model of a frictionless labor market with homogenous workers. 
In such a model the average earnings is higher in the informal sector to compensate for the lack 
of non-pecuniary benefits which are assumed to have nonnegative value. In such an economy if 
there is a formal sector wage premium arbitrage will sweep away this wage differential. 
Persistence of formal sector wage premium suggests existence of barriers to entry into the formal 
sector jobs so that the labor market is deemed segmented. However, in the presence of 
heterogeneous workers a wage gap does not implying segmentation. Roy (1951) stressed the 
possibility of self-selection into the sector where the worker is most productive. Tokman (1982) 
suggested that workers with lower human capital are more likely to sort into informal sector. In 
this case the wage gap would be the results of productivity differentials. Heterogeneity of 
workers would be due to differences in individual observable and unobservable characteristics. 
 
Persistent and significant formal sector wage premium after controlling for observable 
and unobservable individual characteristics indicates barriers to perfect mobility between formal 
and informal sectors and that formal jobs are rationed. Formal sector wages do not clear the 
market due to minimum wage laws, unions or other labor market regulations and efficiency wage 
considerations. This implies that the labor market is segmented as proposed in the mainstream 
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view. Maloney (2004) points out the above mentioned possibility of self-selection into the 
informal sector. Informal sector may be a desirable alternative to formal sector jobs while 
providing flexibility at work hours and location and tax savings.  These are referred to as 
compensating differentials of the informal sector. For many women such differentials may offer a 
better balance between home and work responsibilities and closer location. It is also possible that 
the costs of social security and other benefit contributions and taxes may be more than their value 
perceived by the worker. Thus, the possibility of workers sorting themselves into the informal 
sector supports the competitive view of the labor market. 
 
In addition to these two polar views, recently a third view emphasized the highly 
heterogenous nature of the informal sector as it is observed in many countries. Fields (1990) 
provided a theoretical framework and empirical evidence for a heterogeneous informal sector 
consisting of an upper-tier of those who are voluntarily informal and a lower-tier of those who 
cannot afford to be unemployed but rationed out of a formal job. In such a setting, the commonly 
accepted assumption is that the upper-tier often corresponds to self-employment, whereas the 
lower-tier segment consists mostly of informal wage workers. It is often suggested that the upper 
tier corresponds to competitive and the lower tier corresponds to segmented market structure. 
Several authors provided evidence for the two tier structure including Fields (1990), Cunningham 
and Maloney (2001) in Mexico,  Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002), Henley et al. (2009) and 
Botelho and Ponczek (2011) in Brazil and Gunther and Launow (2006).   
 
In this paper we consider the private sector wage earners and examine the wage 
distribution in the Egyptian labor market during 1998-2012. The main questions asked are as 
follows. Is there a wage penalty for informal wage earners vis-à-vis formal wage earners? Does 
the wage penalty persist even after controlling for observable and unobservable characteristics? 
How does the informal wage penalty vary across different points of the wage distribution? In 
order to answer these questions we first estimate Mincer wage equations both at the mean and at 
different quantiles of the wage distribution taking into account observable characteristics. Then 
we make use of the panel feature of the Egyptian labor market data and estimate models taking 
into account unobservable characteristics. We also consider the possibility of nonlinearity in 
covariate effects and estimate a variant of matching models. In all cases we find a persistent 
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informal wage penalty which is robust to several sensitivity checks. It is smaller when 
unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. It is larger at the top than at the bottom of the 
conditional wage distribution. We also examine the informal wage penalty over time during the 
study period and in different groups according to experience and education. The informal wage 
penalty has increased recently over time and it is larger for the better educated but smaller for the 
more experienced.  
 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Following the introduction Section 2 gives a 
brief review of literature. Section 3 provides a brief background on Egyptian labor market. 
Section 4 explains the data used and the descriptive evidence. The methodology and the empirical 
strategy followed are described in Section 5. Empirical results are presented in Section 6. 
Concluding remarks appear in Section 7. 
 
2. Review of Literature 
 
 There is a wide literature on measuring the wage gap between similar workers in the 
formal and informal sectors. A comprehensive survey of this literature in developing countries is 
given by Leontaridi (1998), Perry et al (2007) and Ruffer and Knight (2007). The overview in 
this section is not meant to be exhaustive. We review the papers which influenced our line of 
thinking in this area.  
 
  It is traditionally assumed and empirically widely shown that informal sector workers earn less 
than their formal sector counterparts. This is verified in particular early writings in the literature 
such as Mazumdar (1975), Heckman and Hotz (1986), Pradhan and van Soest (1995), Tansel 
(1997),  Gong and van Soest (2002), Badaoui et al. (2008), Arias and Khamis (2008) and Blunch 
(2015) among other writers. The observed differences in the wage distributions may be due to a 
nonrandom selection process. In such a case the observed differences between the wage 
distributions do not have causal interpretation. There may be unobservable characteristics of 
workers that may determine simultaneously the sector choice and the earnings. This will render 
the sector choice endogenous producing biased and inconsistent estimates. Thus, one widely used 
empirical strategy employed cross-section data explicitly correcting for the possibility of self-
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selection of workers into formal and informal sectors. They employ Heckman two-stage 
procedure. In this procedure in the first stage a sectoral choice equation is estimated and in the 
second stage wage equations augmented by the correction term are estimated. In this process, 
identification requires presence of relevant variables that will determine the sector choice but 
excluded from the wage equation and orthogonal to the errors of the wage equation. Some studies 
which use this procedure could be questioned on the use of suitable instruments for the 
identification purposes. Further, ignoring unobservable characteristics causes omitted variable 
bias in such cross-section studies. Tansel (1997, 2000 and 2002) are examples of this approach. 
She uses cross-section data and corrects for self-selection. She finds evidence that the labor 
market in Turkey is segmented along formal informal lines. This implies that workers in the 
informal sector queue for the formal jobs. In contrast, Magnac (1991) in Colombia, Carneiro and 
Henley (2001) in Brazil, Gong and van Soest (2002) in Mexico and Arias and Khamis (2008) in 
Argentina employ a similar approach and find evidence against segmented labor markets in these 
countries. This implies that workers choose a sector depending on their expected wage and a 
cost-benefit analysis in each sector as well as their observable and unobservable characteristics. 
 
 Recent availability of panel data in many developing countries enabled researchers to 
deal with the sector of work selection and other estimation problems by using alternative 
methodologies. With the panel data wage variations are observed while the same individual 
switches between formal and informal sectors over time. In particular, with the use of the panel 
data estimation of fixed effect (FE) models and purging of the effect of unobservables became 
possible and a number of researchers followed this route. The FE estimation deals with both 
issues of self-selection and unobservable characteristics providing consistent estimates provided 
that unobserved characteristics are time invariant.  Such studies include Badaoui et al. (2008) in 
South Africa, Pratap and Quintin (2006) in Argentina, Botelho and Ponczek (2011) in Brazil, 
Tansel and Kan (2012) in Turkey, Nguyen et al. (2013) in Vietnam and Bargain, Kwenda (2014) 
in Brazil, Mexico and South Africa used   FE estimation exploiting panel feature of the data.  A 
common finding is that the informal sector penalty either gets smaller or disappears in these 
countries when unobservable worker characteristics are controlled for with FE estimation. Pratap 
and Quintin in Argentina and Badaoui et al. in South Africa are among those who find 
disappearing penalty when controlling for worker heterogeneity, 
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  Most of the earlier studies in the literature focused on estimation at the mean of the 
earnings distribution. Limiting the estimation to the mean of the wage distribution may conceals 
important differentials that may exist along the earnings distribution due to intrinsic 
heterogeneity in jobs.  For instance, Funkhouser (1997) in El Salvador, Gong and van Soest 
(2002) in Mexico, Pratap and Quintin (2006) in Argentina, Badaoui et al. (2008) in South Africa 
focused on estimation at the mean. However, recently several researchers addressed the 
heterogeneity that may exist along the earnings distribution by using quantile regression (QR) 
technique. Botelho and Ponczek (2011) in Brazil provided estimates along the earnings 
distribution. However, it is difficult to address estimation problems such as unobserved 
heterogeneity or sector selection while employing QR estimation. This is due to difficulties in the 
empirical implementation such techniques although they are theoretically well developed and 
available.   There are there studies that attempt to overcome these difficulties. Tannuri-Pianto and 
Pianto (2008) adopt QR technique corrected for selection using instrumental variables (IV) in a 
cross-sectional data set in Brazil. Nguyen et al. (2013) in Vietnam and Bargain and Kwenda 
(2014) in Brazil, Mexico and South Africa adopt a fixed effect model estimation with QR 
technique (FEQR).  Staneva and Arabsheibani (2014) use a QR decomposition technique taking 
into account self-selection of individuals into formal and informal employment types in 
Tajikistan. They find a significant informal employment wage premium across the earnings 
distribution. Lehmann and Zaiceva (2013) find wage penalty in Russia in the lower part of the 
wage distribution which disappears at the upper part implying a two tier informal labor market. 
  
There is also a strand of literature that use IV techniques often in conjunction with other 
methodologies in order to address various econometric issues such as measurement errors. Such 
studies include Marcouiller  et al. (1997) in El Salvador, Mexico and Peru, Carneiro and Henley 
(2001), Kingdon and Knight (2004) in South Africa, Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2008) in Brazil, 
Botelho and Ponczek (2011) and Falco et al. (2011) in Ghana and Tanzania. 
 
 More recently, several studies used various versions of propensity score matching (PSM) 
or propensity score weighting (PSW) techniques in order to secure formal and informal workers 
only with comparable observable and time-invariant unobservable characteristics for a better 
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comparison of their wages (Smith and Todd, 2005). Such techniques also address the issue of 
misspecifications that may occur due to linearity assumption on the covariates. Therefore, this 
procedure is used by Calderon-Madrid (1999) in Mexico, Pratap and Quintin (2006) in Argentina 
and Badaoui et al. (2008) in South Africa in order to estimate the wage gap at the mean. Botelho 
and Ponczek (2011) and Bargain and Kwenda (2014) use PSW technique in combination with 
QR in order to provide estimates along the quantiles. 
 
Informal sector in the MENA countries has been the topic of investigation in several 
recent studies such as Alloush et al. (2013) and Gatti et al. (2014). Similarly there has been some 
recent studies investigating informal sector in Egypt such as Wahba (2009) and Tansel and 
Ozdemir (2014). However little is known about the informal sector earnings structure compared 
to that of the formal sector in Egypt. Gatti et al. (2014) is an exception but provide only cross 
section evidence in 2006 from Egypt as well as from several other MENA countries. We extend 
this analysis by taking unobserved characteristics into account and including estimating across 
the conditional wage distribution. 
 
3. The Background on Egyptian Labor Market 
 
In this study we define informal employment to include those wage earners who are not 
covered by social security or who do not have a contract. Several studies indicate existence of a 
rather large informal sector in Egypt. The labor force not contributing to social security was an 
average of 45 percent during 2000-2007 and an average of 35 percent of GDP during 1999-2007 
was undeclared (Gatti et al. 2014).  This is comparable to what is observed in Mexico which is 
43% when social security definition is used (Marcoullier et al., 1997). Tansel and Ozdemir 
(2014) include an extensive recent review of the Egyptian economy and the labor market. For this 
reason, here we will provide only a brief summary of the Egyptian labor market. 
 
According to the ELMPS 2012, formal, informal and irregular wage workers are about 
10, 15 and 15 percent respectively of the male sample and around 2, 2 and 0.62 percent 
respectively of the female sample and the government employment is about 24 percent among 
men and 12 percent among women however, about 10 percent of men and 72 percent of women 
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are out of labor force (Tansel and Ozdemir, 2014). Currently, public sector employs 27 percent of 
all workers and 44 percent of the wage earners (Amin, 2014). The government employment 
opportunities have been declining during the past two decades.  During the 2006-2012 period 
public administration lost about 40000 jobs (World Bank, 2014). In spite of this decline, 
government employment share is still rather high and it remains a more attractive option in 
particular for women than private sector jobs. Individual self employment and employment in 
household enterprises constituted more than a third of overall employment in 2006. Nearly half of 
private sector wage employment was in micro enterprises of fewer than five workers (Said, 
2009).  
 
Female labor force participation is very low as it is in most MENA countries and has been 
declining over 2006-2012 while that of male has increased slightly. The labor force participation 
rate was 23.1 percent for females and 80.2 percent for males in 2012 (Assaad and Krafft, 2013). 
Less than a quarter of the total labor force is 15-29 years of age. Unemployment rate was over 13 
percent in 2013 (9.8 for males and 24.2 for females) (CAPMAS, 2014). Unemployment is a 
problem among young people. Over three-quarters of the unemployed was aged 15-29 years. The 
unemployment rate is also rather high among the highly educated. The secondary or above 
educated account about 75 percent of unemployed males and 90 percent of unemployed females 
(Assaad and Kraft, 2013). Thus, although unemployment rates of women and young are very 
high their labor force participations are very low. 
 
 According to Said (2009) inequality in earnings declined from 1988 to 1998 but 
increased from 1998 to 2006. The 90 to 10 percentile ratio was about 5.80 in earnings in 
2006.The Gini coefficient in earnings was 39 percent in 1988, 37 percent in 1998 and 55 percent 
in 2006. The Gini coefficient for the private sector was 40 percent in 1988, 38 percent in 1998 
and 45 percent in 2006.  
 
Labor Law enforcement remains weak in Egypt (Lohmann, 2010). Further, labor 
legislation predominantly effects small number of wage and salary workers in the private formal 
sector, civil servants and public sector. Roushdy and Salwaness (2015) note that employers must 
contribute 41 percent of employees’ basic wage as social security contribution which makes 
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microenterprises to formalize highly costly. Labor law in Egypt might be considered rigid de 
jure, especially concerning employment protection, hiring and termination, by international 
standards but, they are not enforced and widely evaded de facto and does not reach informal 
sector (Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo, 2011). Various practices allow avoiding the compliance with 
firing regulations by the employers. The trade union membership is weak due to restrictions on 
the rights to establish one and become a member (Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo, 2011). The trade 
union density rate in 2007 is as a proportion of total employment is 16.1 and as a proportion of 
wage and salary earners is 26.1 compared to 14.6 and 25.1 respectively in Turkey and 71.5 and 
99.2 respectively in Denmark (Hayter et al., 2011). There is little scope for collective bargaining 
in the private sector. The collective bargaining coverage rate as a proportion of total employment 
is 2.1 and as a proportion of wage and salary earners 3.4 compared to 95.6 in Denmark as a 
proportion of total employment (Hayter et al., 2011).  In 20012 the minimum wage is adjusted for 
the first time since the 1980’s and increased to 700 and in 2014 to 1200 Egyptian Pounds (EP).1  
This is effective only in the public sector.  
 
 In 1998, 57 percent of all employment was informal and increased to 61 percent by 2006 
although there was a trend toward greater formalization in private wage employment (Said, 
2009).   This increase is believed to be due to the privatization and the introduction of the 2003 
Labor Law. The decline in public sector employment opportunities during the past two decades 
contributed to an increase in informalization of the labor market. The 2003 Labor Law 3 brought 
more flexibility in formal employment relations. It allowed temporary contracts and easier firing 
of workers. This is believed to contribute to an increase informal employment yet at the same 
time brought a certain degree of formalization since then according to Wahba and Assaad (2015).  
However, the World Bank (2014) notes that there has been a recent increase in informality nearly 
across every industry and at all education categories for men. 
 
Two areas of concern are noted by several authors such as Assaad (2009) and Said 
(2009). One is the high unemployment rate among the university graduates and the other is the 
declining rates of participation among educated females who are discouraged that they cannot 
find government employment and drop out of the labor force. However, present authors believe 
                                                     
1
 The US dolar exchange rate was equal to 6.04 EP in May 2012 and it was an average of 7.05 in 2014. Thus, 700 EP 
was 116 US dolars and 1200 EP was 170 US dolars. 
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that none of these should be as large a concern as the presence of large informal sector with low 
wages.  
 
4. The Data and Descriptive Evidence 
 
This study is based on the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) which is a 
longitudinal survey carried out in 1998, 2006 and 2012. It was conducted by the Economic 
Research Forum (ERF) in cooperation with Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and 
Statistics (CAPMAS). ELMPS is a nationally representative panel survey that covers a wide-
range of topics, ranging from individual, demographic and labor market characteristics to 
parental background, housing, time use, fertility and other topics. The data and their 
documentation are provided in the ERF web page. The 1998 round of the ELMPS includes a 
nationally representative sample of 4,816 households with 23,997 individuals. Similar numbers in 
the 2006 round are 8,351 households with 37,140 individuals and in the 2012 round are 12,060 
households and 49,186 individuals. Attrition rate was substantial both at the household and 
individual level. We use the weights to adjust for attrition in the descriptive statistics table we 
provide. The attrition issue is discussed by Assaad and Krafft (2014) extensively. 
 
We create a panel of observations that are seven years and five years apart in which 
workers are observed only twice or three times. These are two-year panels of 1998-2006 and 
2006-2012 and a three year panel of 1998-2006-2012. We focus only on the private sector wage 
earners. Those who are employed by the government are excluded since the wage determination 
mechanisms differ vastly across public and private sectors.
2
 We  restrict the sample  to 15-65 
years old male wage earners who are not in education or training. We exclude unpaid family 
workers (UFW) as there is no information on their imputable earnings. Self-employed are 
excluded because the ELMPS does not have information on earnings of the self-employed at the 
time of preparation of this paper. We focus on private sector, full-time non-agricultural wage-
earners. Further we trim the upper and lower one percent of the observation in order to exclude 
outliers. The real hourly wages are reported in the data set and computed as the monthly wages 
per hour of work in the primary and secondary jobs deflated by the CPI in terms of 2012 prices. 
                                                     
2
 For an analysis of the public versus private formal wage gap in Egypt see Tansel et al. (2015a). 
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 In the recent literature there is a move towards using benefit-based definition of 
informality from other definitions based on type of employment or firm size. The International 
Conference of Labor Statisticians accepted in 2003 the benefit-based definition of informality as 
their official definition.   Therefore accordingly, in this study we define informal employment  as 
those wage earners who are not covered by social security through their employment  and or do 
not have an employment contract. We conduct a separate analysis of the male and female 
samples. However, the labor force participation of women in Egypt is very low and most of them 
are either inactive or work as unpaid family worker (Tansel and Ozdemir, 2014) and we do not 
address the issue of women’s selection into employment since selection within the QR 
framework is a nonstandard econometric procedure. Further, the number of observations is small 
in the female sample.  Therefore, in this paper we focus only on male wage earners. We comment 
on the results for the female wage earners at the last part of the section on estimation results. 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the male and female samples of formal and 
informal wage earners. We observe that 66 percent of the male sample and 46 percent of the 
female sample are informal. Thus, informality is higher among men than among women. Table 1 
also shows that log hourly (real) wage is larger in the formal than in the informal employment for 
both males and females. The informal wage gap in the female sample (77 percent) is larger than 
in the male sample (33 percent). There is greater inequality in wages in the formal sector than in 
the informal sector implying that the formal jobs are more heterogenous than the informal ones. 
Informal wage earners work more hours per week than the formal wage earners in both the male 
and female samples. Formal wage earners are more experienced (older) and more educated than 
the informal wage earners in both the male and female samples. Women are better educated than 
men in both the formal and informal employment. In the male sample formal employment is 
dominated by manufacturing activities while informal employment is dominated by construction. 
In the female sample formal employment is primarily a service sector activity while informal 
employment is dominated by manufacturing. In both the male and female samples small firms are 
concentrated in the informal sector. Close to four fifths of the informal male and close half of the 
informal female wage earners work in firms with less than 10 workers. In contrast, about two 
fifths of the male and a third of the female formal wage earners work in firms with over 100 
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workers. Formal employment is concentrated in Greater Cairo informal employment is 
concentrated in Rural Lower for the males.  Formal and informal female wage work is mostly 
observed in Greater Cairo. Over half of the formal and informal female employment is in this 
region. 
 
 Insert Table 1 About Here  
 
Table A1 provides the marginal effects of the covariates from a probit model estimation 
of propensity to be in the informal sector. There is a U-shaped relationship between age and 
informality. The probability of being informal is higher for the young and the elderly in the male 
sample. It may be a point of entry to the labor market for the young as well as an option for the 
older workers who lack skills or physical capital. However, informality is not related to age in the 
female sample. The probability of being formal increases with education in both the male and 
female sample. Married are less likely to be informal. For men the highest probability of being 
informal is observed in the construction sector relative to manufacturing. Transportation has a 
lower probability of being informal relative to manufacturing. Each of the regions have higher 
probability of informal employment compared to Greater Cairo while highest such probability is 
observed for Urban Lower and Urban Upper. Finally, the probability of informality did not 
change from 1998 to 2006 but increased significantly from 1998 to 2012. This is consistent with 
the observation that recent public sector retrenchment and the flexibility in employment relations 
introduced after the 2003 Labor Law contributed to an increase in informal employment. 
 
5. Econometric Methodology 
 
We estimate Mincer wage equations including a dummy variable for the private informal 
employment the coefficient of which captures the conditional wage penalty/premium for the 
informal sector. We use Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Quantile Regression (QR) and Fixed 
Effects Quantile Regression (FEQR) techniques. The OLS model is estimated on a sample pooled 
panel observations. It is as follows: 
 
itititit xIy           (1) 
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Next we estimate the FE model where we use panel feature of the data and control for time-
invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. The fixed effect estimator is consistent as long as 
unobserved characteristics are constant over time. The FE model can be written as follows 
 
 itiititit xIy          (2) 
 
Where in models (1) and (2) ity  is log hourly wages, itx  is the vector of control variables for 
individual i at time t including a constant, itI  is a dummy variable taking a value one if the wage 
earner is informal at time t. The formal wage workers is the base category. i  in model (2) is the 
individual fixed effect. it  is a normally, independently and identically distributed stochastic 
error term with zero conditional mean. The estimated   measures the informal employment 
penalty/premium. 
 
Next, we go one step further and investigate the informal employment wage 
penalty/premium along the conditional wage distribution using QR. Finally, we extend the 
standard QR method to using panel data and estimate the FEQR model. Estimating the QR 
models are especially important since the conditional earnings differentials across different 
quantiles proxy for unobservable earnings potential. The QR and FEQR models can be written as 
in equations (3) and (4) as follows. 
 
 1,0    ,)()()()(   ititititit xGIyq     (3) 
 
 1,0    ,)()()(   itiititit xIyq      (4) 
 
Where )( ityq  is the 
th  quantile of the log hourly wages. i  are the individual fixed effects that    
shift the location of the conditional quantiles of the log hourly wages in the same manner across 
the quantiles. However, the effects of the explanatory variables differ by the quantiles of interest. 
The vector of estimated coefficients )(  provide the estimated rates of return to the different 
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covariates at the   %th quantile of the log earnings distribution and the estimated coefficient 
)(  represents informal employment earnings penalty/premium respectively at the various 
quantiles. Koenker (2004) was the first to suggest FEQR technique, as a direct extension of the 
standard QR method. Canay (2011) suggested a simple two-step approach to FEQR estimation. 
In the first step the individual effects which are pure location shifters are estimated by traditional 
mean estimations such as FE estimation. Then predicted individual effects are used to correct 
earnings as in iii yy ˆˆ  . The corrected earnings are then used in the traditional QR estimation. 
 
In the empirical specification of the models given above we use the following control 
variables. Age, age squared, years of education, marital status, presence of children, sectors of 
economic activity, regions of location. Two indicators of time, for 2006 and 2012 are included  to 
control for the effect of macroeconomic environment on wages over time. The base year is 1998. 
There are nine sectors of economic activity are included to take into account the effect of 
differences in the structure of sectors on wages. They are manufacturing (including mining and 
electricity), construction, trade, transportation, and services (including finance). The base 
industry is manufacturing. There are six regions of location. They are Greater Cairo, Alexandria 
and Suveysh, Urban Lower, Urban Upper, Rural Lower and Rural Upper. The base region is 
Greater Cairo.  
 
6. Estimation Results 
 
6.1. Main Results 
 
 The main estimation results are reported in Figure 1. Figure 1 Panel A reports the raw 
(unconditional) informal log wage gap. Panels B and C report the estimated coefficient  of the 
informal sector dummy (I) in the equations presented in the previous section. Panel B reports 
conditional informal log wage gap at the mean (OLS, horizontal solid line) and at the different 
quantiles (QR, solid curve). Similarly, Panel C reports the conditional informal log wage gap 
controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity at the mean (FE, horizontal solid line) and at 
the different quantiles (FEQR, solid curve). The 95 percent confidence intervals are indicated by 
dashed lines for OLS and FE estimates and by the shaded areas for QR, FEQR and IPW-FEQR 
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estimates. The confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors for the OLS and FE 
estimates and on bootstrapped standard errors for the QR, FEQR and IPW-FEQR estimates. The 
estimation results in Figure 1 are based on Model (2) in Table A2-A3 for males in the Appendix.
3
  
A summary of the results for informal log wage penalty appear in Table 2. The unobserved 
characteristics may include not only preferences, tastes, and innate ability and talents, risk 
aversion and school quality but also differentials in access to social, personal or professional 
networking, unionization rates and bargaining power. 
 
 Insert Figure 1 About Here  
 
The Kernel density estimates of the log hourly wages in the formal and informal sectors 
are provided in Figure 2 for the three years in our sample. The graphs indicate that the Kernel 
density curves for the informal sector lie to the left of those for the formal sector indicating that 
the informal sector wage distribution is dominated by the formal sector wage distribution and that 
informal wages are lower than the formal wages.  Further, in the 2012 sample only 15 percent of 
the formal workers and 32 percent of the informal workers earn less than the minimum wage of 
700 effective in the public sector. Therefore employment above the minimum wage (which is 
effective in the public sector) is large indicating that this is could not be a cause of informality in 
Egypt. The Figure 1 Panel A shows the raw (unconditional) wage gap. We observe an informal 
wage penalty of 27 percent at the mean. The raw informal wage penalty increases across the 
wage distribution and reaches 34 percent at the highest quantile. Kernel density distributions and 
the figures for raw wage gap do not take into account the differences in observable or 
unobservable characteristics between the formal and informal sectors which are best considered 
in a regression analysis framework as discussed below. 
                                                     
3
 Estimation results reported in the Appendix tables (based on Model (2)) indicate the following. The wage returns to 
experience (as proxied by age) are positive and exhibit a quadratic relationship. The wage returns to experience 
decreases as one moves to higher quantiles in the QR estimation while there is no discernable pattern across the 
quantiles in the FEQR estimation. The returns to education is quite low, 1.5 percent at the mean and increase 
smoothly across quantiles and about 2 percent at the highest quantiles (insignificant at the lowest quantiles). Largest 
returns are attained at the construction sector compared to manufacturing which is the sector with most concentration 
of informality. The wage returns in the construction sector is highest at the lowest quantile and decrease across 
quantiles. Assaad (1997) finds segmentation within the construction sector itself. The wage returns are higher both at 
the mean and across quantiles when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. The wage returns are lower in 
the trade and service sectors of economic activity compared to manufacturing. The wage returns are higher in 
Greater Cairo than in all of the other regions. Finally, the wage returns are significantly higher in 2006 and 2012 than 
in 1998. 
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 Insert Figure 2 About Here  
 
When we perform OLS estimation with controls for observable characteristics Figure 1 
Panel B indicates a mean informal wage penalty of 18 percent for the entire sample. It is about 18 
percent in the lowest quantile, decreases in the middle quantiles and increases to about 20 percent 
at the top quantile. This is 9 percentage points smaller than the mean raw wage penalty. This 
indicates that higher levels of education and experience in the formal than in the informal sector 
play a significant role in reducing the wage gap and they account for almost 33 percent of the raw 
wage gap. However OLS do not control for unobserved heterogeneity and the informal wage 
penalty may be driven by such omitted factors. When time-invariant unobservable factors are 
controlled for as in the FE estimation using panel feature of the data, given in Panel C, the mean 
informal wage penalty decreases to about 15 percent implying important role for unobserved 
heterogeneity. This is consistent with the hypothesis that informal sector dummy is negatively 
correlated with unobserved skills meaning lower  unobserved skills in the informal sector and 
that workers negatively select into informal employment. Falco et al. (2011) find in Ghana and 
Tanzania that unobserved characteristics are much more important than observed human capital 
in explaining formal and informal wage gap. Therefore, there is an informal wage penalty even 
after controlling for observable and unobservable individual characteristics. 
 
 The QR results in the Panel B when controlling for observable characteristics confirm the 
informal wage penalty at each of the conditional quantiles and range from 18 percent at the 
bottom to 20 percent at the top of the distribution and they do not differ significantly across the 
quantiles. The FEQR results in Panel C further control for time-invariant unobservable 
heterogeneity and also confirm the informal wage penalty at each of the quantiles. In this case the 
penalties at each of the quantiles are lower than in case of QR estimates and range between 9 
percent at the bottom and 17 percent at the top of the distribution. An F-test indicates that 
conditional informal wage penalty do not differ significantly across the quantiles. We have also 
tested for the statistically significance of the pairwise difference in the penalties observed in 
successive quantiles. Out of such four possible differences none of them are statistically 
significant in the QR and only one of them (q50-q25) is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
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level in the FEQR estimation. The larger informal penalty at the top than at the bottom of the 
distribution as we find in Egypt is also observed in Dominican Republic (Perry et al., 2007). 
 
 Above results indicate that the conditional informal wage penalty both at the mean and at 
different quantiles is lower when time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity is taken into 
account. These results imply that unobserved characteristics are better among the formal wage 
earners and that the observed and unobserved attributes are positively related in the sense that 
they are both better in the formal than in the informal sector.  
 
 The results indicate that informal wage penalty remains implying that formal wage 
earners are better off than the informal ones, even after controlling for observable and unobserved 
individual heterogeneity. There may be a number of factors responsible for this. It could be due 
to segmentation or exclusion restriction. It could be also due to differences in the firm level 
observed characteristics such as firm sizes between formal and informal sectors or other job 
attributes such as unobserved firm level factors such as risk independence and in-kind-rewards 
which we did not control for in this study but some of which may have been controlled for by the 
firm size variable we use. On this confer the discussion below in the section on sensitivity 
exercises.  
 
 The informal wage penalty of about 19 percent found in this study when controlling 
observable characteristics is comparable to that of 12 percent found by Gatti et al. (2014) in 
Egypt in 2006 also with observable controls. The penalties found for Egypt (15 percent) when 
both observable and unobservable characteristics are taken into account are modest and 
comparable to those found for Brazil (5 percent), Mexico (9 percent) and South Africa (19 
percent) by Bargain and Kwenda (2004) and for Vietnam (11 percent) by Nguyen et al. (2013). 
Bargain and Kwenda (2004) also observe that unobservable characteristics play a larger role in 
South Africa than in Brazil and Mexico. Further, Bargain and Kwenda (2004) in Brazil, Mexico 
and South Africa, Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2008) in Brazil, Nguyen et al. (2013) in Vietnam 
and Lehman and Zeiceva (2013) in Russia found decreasing penalties over the quantiles which 
disappear in some cases at the top of the distribution such as in Russia. In contrast, we found that 
informal sector wage penalties increase across quantiles in Egypt. They are largest at the bottom 
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of the wage distribution than at the top. There are also several studies which found evidence for 
informal sector wage premium such as Marcouiller et al. (1997) and Maloney (199) in Mexico 
and Staneva and Arabsheibani (2014) in Tajikistan. The latter study also found that informal 
employment wage premium in Tajikistan is larger at the lower end of the conditional wage 
distribution than at the top. Informal wage premium could be a compensation for the fringe 
benefits that are not available in the informal sector. 
 
6.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
6.2.1 Inverse Probability Weighted Fixed Effect Quantiles Regression Estimation (IPW-
FEQR) 
 
The QR estimation assumes linearity of the effects of covariates. However, the 
distribution of covariates between formal and informal sectors may differ. This can be accounted 
for using matching techniques. Matching techniques enable a comparison of wage outcomes for 
formal and informal workers only with comparable characteristics.  This deals with the lack of 
common support in OLS where we may be comparing very dissimilar workers. They provide 
consistent estimates even if the relationship between the dependent variable and the covariates 
are non-linear (Fortin, et al., 2011). Pratap and Quintin (2006) and Badaoui et al. (2006) used a 
combination of difference in differences and PSM approach at the mean. Botelho and Ponczek 
(2011) and Bargain and Kwenda (2014) extended this approach to quantile estimations by 
combining IPW and FEQR techniques as suggested by Firpo (2007). This procedure is in 
particular valuable because as shown by Smith and Todd (2005) it allows for selection on 
observable as well as selection on time-invariant unobservable characteristics.  In this procedure 
observations are weighted by the inverse propensity scores of being in the formal and informal 
sectors. The propensity scores of being in the formal and informal sectors are estimated via a 
probit model of sector selection given in Table A1 in the Appendix. The conditional 
independence assumption required to hold in order to have unbiased estimates is likely to be 
satisfied since a large number of factors which determine both selection and earnings are 
considered. The resulting distributions of the derived propensity scores are shown in Figure A1. 
First, a mean FE, then a FEQR estimation is carried out on the inverse probability weighted 
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observations. The results are reported in Figure 2, Panel D and Table 2. These results are very 
similar to the FEQR estimates. Therefore, our conclusions of modest but increasing informal 
wage penalty across the quantiles of the conditional wage distributions are upheld. 
 
 Insert Table 2 About Here  
 
6.2.2 Effect of Firm Size 
 
 We now investigate the role of one important job attribute namely the firm size as an additional 
control variable in the baseline specification. In both the developed and developing countries larger firms 
pay higher wages on average. Oi and Idson (1999) provide a survey on this. Söderbom et al. (2005) show 
that this is not a result of employing high ability individuals. Bulow and Summers (1986) and Ringuede 
(1998) suggest high monitoring costs in large firms and Bertola and Garibaldi (2001) suggest job 
matching and search costs in large firms as possible reasons. Brown and Medoff (1989) and Arai 
(2003) find sizable firm size effect even after controlling for individual heterogeneity. Stroble 
and Thornton (2004) find that the firm size effect in developing countries is larger than in 
developed countries. At the same time larger firms are more likely to be formal since because of 
their visibility they experience larger risk of being caught defaulting on regulations. Thus, formal 
wages will appear to be higher if firm size is not taken into account.  Several authors such as 
Badaoui et al. (2010) draw attention to the observation that larger firms pay higher wages and 
that informal wage penalty may be a result of firm size effect.  
 
First we note some observations on informality and firm size in our sample. The negative 
correlation coefficient of 67 percent between informal sector dummy and firm size indicates that 
as firm size increases informality decreases. Indeed, in our sample, within firms with less than 10 
workers about 85 percent of the wage earners are informal while within firms with more than 100 
workers only about 16 percent are informal. Thus, even the largest firms hire about one out of 
seven workers informally.  Further, the distribution of the firm size across quantiles of the wage 
distribution indicate that in the bottom quantile 72 percent of wage earners work in firms with 
less than 10 workers while only 10 percent work in firms with more than 100 workers. 
Conversely, in the top quantile 55 percent of wage earners work in firms with less than 10 
workers while 25 percent work in firms with more than 100 workers. Thus, firms with less than 
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10 workers are concentrated in the bottom quantile while firms with more than 100 workers are 
concentrated in the top quantile. In light of these we conclude that informality decreases as firm 
size increases and that informality is higher among small firms but it is less common among the 
large firms. Further, firm size increases as one moves across the quantiles.  
 
  Therefore, we re-estimate the models by adding dummy variables for different firm sizes. 
The results are reported in Table A2. Controlling for the firm size reduces the coefficient estimate 
of the informal wage penalty in both the OLS and FE estimations as expected given the above 
mentioned high correlation between informal sector dummy and the firm size. In particular, when 
firm size controlled for the penalty in the FE estimation is reduced from 15 to 14 percent both of 
which are strongly statistically significant. Therefore, the penalty itself decreases somewhat but 
does not disappear indicating that our results are not driven by the firm size effect.  
 
 6.2.3 Measurement Errors 
 
We found in the previous sections that FE estimates are lower than their OLS counterparts 
both at the mean and at the conditional quantiles of the wage distribution. Grıliches and Hausman 
(1986) proposed the measurement error bias as an explanation for this finding since FE 
estimators can be seriously biased if measurement errors are present. It is possible that 
formal/informal sector status is incorrectly reported. If so, there will be measurement errors in the 
indicator of informal sector dummy. As it is well known this will lead to an attention bias in its 
coefficient estimate. Under classical measurement errors assumptions the First Difference (FD) 
estimator has a larger bias than the FE estimator which in turn has a larger bias than the OLS. 
Therefore, comparing the estimates from the FE and FD methods will give an idea about the 
importance of the measurement errors bias. Table 2 reports the FE and FD estimates of the 
informal wage penalty at the mean. We observe that these two estimates are essentially the same 
implying that possible measurement error due to incorrect reporting of the sector status is not a 
concern for our results.   
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6.2.4 Comparing Movers between Formal and Informal Sectors 
 
The identification of the informal wage gap in our empirical strategy depends on the presence of 
substantial number of movers between the formal and informal sectors in both directions. If this is not the 
case the data would reduce to a cross-section sample where FE estimation will not be feasible. This is not 
a concern in our data for the following reasons.
4
 We note that about 22 percent of the sample in 1998 
moved in either direction between 1998-2006 and about 23 percent of the sample in 2006 moved in either 
direction between 2006-2012. Next, we note that the movers across sectors are also substantial at different 
quantiles. This is shown in Figure A2 in the Appendix for the two time periods. The figure shows the 
informal movers as percentage of the base period informal observations and the formal to informal movers 
as percentage of the base period formal observations. These computations are done at different quantiles 
of the base period wages for the two time periods. We observe that during both of the time periods formal 
to informal transitions are more frequent at the bottom and informal to formal transitions are more 
frequent at the top of the wage distribution. Nevertheless there are substantial numbers of transitions either 
direction at all quantiles of the wage distribution validating the identification strategy in our estimations. 
 
 Further, the identification of the informal wage gap also depends on the assumption that the 
informal wage penalty for those who move from the formal to informal sector is the same as the penalty 
for those who move in the opposite direction. That is, the movers must change states randomly. This issue 
becomes a problem in FE estimation if unobserved heterogeneity varies over time due to a shock on 
individual or job characteristics resulting in transitions between sectors. In recent years evidence has 
accumulated that individual or macroeconomic shocks or socioeconomic conditions may trigger changes 
in unobserved characteristics. For instance, Dohmen et al. (2015) reported a fall in willingness to take 
risks during the Great Recession in Germany and Ukraine with consequences about labor market 
dynamics and outcomes.
5
 This will render formal informal sector choice endogenous and the FE estimator 
inconsistent (Botelho and Ponczek, 2013, Nguyen et al., 2013 and Bargain and Kwenda, 2014). In such 
case, wage penalty or premium associated with these transitions may differ. Since formal sector jobs are 
viewed better, the penalty for those moving from formal to informal sector would be larger than the 
penalty for those moving in the opposite direction. 
                                                     
4
 Further, the transition probabilities between sectors provided by Tansel and Ozdemir (2014) indicate substantial 
movements. They find that the transition probability from formal to informal wage work is 16 percent from 2006 to 
2012 while the same probability is about 12 percent for the transition in the opposite direction for the male wage 
earners. 
5
 In recent years evidence has accumulated that individual or macroeconomic shocks or socioeconomic conditions 
may trigger changes in unobserved characteristics. For instance, Dohmen et al. (2015) reported a fall in willingness 
to take risks during the Great Recession in Germany and Ukraine with consequences about labor market dynamics 
and outcomes. 
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 In order to check for the relevance of such a possibility we carry out separate estimations of the 
wage gap for those moving from formal to informal sector and for those moving in the opposite direction. 
The resulting informal wage gaps are reported in Figure 1, Panels E and F. We observe that the informal 
wag gap for these two different transitions are similar except at the upper quantiles where the wage gap is 
larger for the formal to informal transitions than for the transitions in the opposite direction. Bargain and 
Kwenda found similar results in South Africa. 
 
6.2.5 Informal Wage Penalty over Time 
 
 We now relax the assumption of constant wage penalty over time. The time period 
studied in this paper does indeed involve different macro-economic conditions. Now we ask the 
question has the size of penalty changed during the period of analysis? In order to observe the 
possible changes in the size of informal wage penalty over time we perform the same analysis for 
the two time periods of 1998-2006 and 2006-2012. The summary results for the OLS and FE 
estimation are reported in Table 3 and the QR and FEQR estimates appear in Table 4. We 
observe that the OLS estimate of the informal wage penalty increases from 18 percent during 
1998-2006 to 24 percent during 2006-2012 periods while the FE estimate increases from 
insignificance to 19 percent during the same time periods.  For both of the period FE estimates 
are lower than the OLS estimates. Thus, there is evidence that informal wage penalty increased 
over time during the 1998-2012 period. Table 4 confirms this increase in informal wage penalty 
over time with QR and FEQR estimates. Further, focusing on the FEQR estimates in Table 4 
observe that informal penalty slightly decreases across quantiles during the 1998-2006 period 
while it increases across the quantiles from about 14 in the lowest quantile to about 21 percent at 
the top quantile during the 2006-2012 period. This is consistent with the   finding of increasing 
penalty across quantiles for the entire period of 1998-2012 which is one of the main conclusions 
of this paper.  
  
 Insert Table 3 About Here  
 Insert Table 4 About Here  
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6.2.6 Informal Wage Penalty by Experience and Education 
 
In the previous sections we saw that the formal sector workers are more experienced and better 
educated. In this section we relax the assumption that wage returns to experience (as proxied by age) and 
education are the same in the formal and informal sectors. Interaction terms of informal sector dummy 
with experience and education indicates significant differences between the two sectors in these respects. 
Therefore, repeat the analysis for two subsamples differentiated by levels of experience and education. 
Namely, we consider those who are younger than the mean age of the sample and older than the mean age 
of the sample. We also consider those who are less educated (whose years of schooling is less than the 
mean for the sample) and better educated (whose years of schooling is more than the mean for the 
sample). The OLS and FE results are reported in Table 3 and the QR and FEQR results appear in Table 4. 
 
 The FE results where both the observable and unobservable individual heterogeneity are taken 
into account indicate that informal wage penalty is larger for the less experienced than for the better 
experienced. That is, the penalty decreases as individuals become more experienced. This is similar to 
what is found by Bargain and Kwenda (2014) in Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. In contrast, Botelho 
and Ponczek (2011) found in Brazil that there is no informal wage penalty for the young and that there is a 
penalty for the older workers. The FEQR results indicate that informal sector wage penalty is larger for 
the less experienced than for the more experienced at all quantiles. Further, for both experience groups the 
penalty increases across the quantiles and it is highest at the top of the distribution. These results confirm 
that the young has less experience and informal sector provides an entry level job for them with a larger 
penalty regardless of whether at low-paying or high-paying jobs as pointed out by Bosch and Maloney 
(2007).  
  
Considering the two groups with different levels of education the FE results (which are lower than 
the OLS estimates) in Table 3 indicate no informal wage penalty for the less educated and about 13 
percent penalty for the better educated. This is similar to what is found by Botelho and Ponczek (2011) in 
Brazil. The FEQR results in Table 4 indicate that penalty for the less educated is less than that for better 
educated at all quantiles. That is less educated face smaller penalties than the better educated. The penalty 
for the less educated are somewhat smaller at the bottom and at the top of the wage distribution than those 
in middle. For the better educated the penalty increases across the quantiles and it is twice as large at the 
top of the distribution than at the bottom. We can say that the informal wage penalty increases with 
education in Egypt. This is similar to the findings of Botelho and Ponczek (2011) in Brazil where informal 
penalty increases both with experience and education and larger at the bottom than at the top of the 
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distribution. Bargain and Kwenda (2014) find in Brazil, Mexico and South Africa that those with higher 
experience face smaller penalties than those with less experience and there is a larger penalty for those 
with higher education in Brazil and Mexico.  
 
6.2.7 Gender Dimension  
 
In this section we remark on our estimates for the female sample. However, our estimates for the 
females should be considered cautiously since we did not take into account their selection into labor force 
participation and the number of observations in the female sample is small.  As remarked earlier a large 
fraction of women are either inactive or work as unpaid family workers in Egypt (Tansel and Ozdemir, 
2014).  Women are less likely to be informal than men.  Table 2 shows that the mean log hourly wage is 
larger in the formal than in the informal sector. The raw wage penalty at the mean is 76 percent but 
reduces to 41 percent when observable characteristics are taken into account as in OLS estimation. The 
penalty increases to 55 percent when unobservable characteristics are considered as in FE estimation. The 
penalties increase somewhat across the quantiles with QR and increase somewhat across the quantiles 
with FEQR estimation. The informal wage penalty is substantially larger for women than for men. This 
could be due to a discrimination against women in the informal sector. In a way this explains why women 
move out of the labor market when they cannot locate a government or a formal sector job. 
 
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
This paper considers the private sector wage earners and examines the wage distribution 
in the Egyptian labor market during 1998-2012 using ELMPS panel data. We analyse the wage 
differential across formal and informal sectors. The motivation is to add to our understanding of 
the labor market in Egypt. We extend the previous work by using panel data fixed effect 
estimation and estimation across the wage distribution with quantile regression technique. 
Workers who cannot access formal employment yet cannot remain unemployed experience wage 
penalty in the informal sector compared to the wage earners in the formal sector where workers 
benefit from retirement and health and safety regulations. Penalties are smaller for the FE and 
FEQR estimates than for the OLS and QR estimates confirming that unobserved skills are 
important. Thus informal workers have disadvantage not only in observable but also in 
unobservable characteristics. Informal workers face a larger wage penalty at the top of the wage 
distribution than at lower parts implying that the largest penalty is between the best paid formal and 
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best paid informal workers. The sensitivity analysis reveals that the main results are robust in 
qualitative terms in several dimensions. Further we find that the informal wage penalty has 
increased recently over time and it is larger for the better educated but smaller for the more 
experienced.  
 
Informal wage earners are either younger or older than formal ones, they are less educated 
and more likely to work in construction. Construction sector employment has a wage premium. 
Married are less likely to be informal and has a wage premium. Greater Cairo is less likely to be 
informal and Urban Upper and Rural Upper has the highest likelihood of being informal. The 
likelihood of informality has increased recently possibly due to recent public sector retrenchment 
and the flexibility in employment relations brought about by the 2003 Labor Law. These issues 
need to be investigated further. 
  
Our results are consistent with other studies which have shown that there is an informal 
sector penalty in developing countries. The results support the segmentation and exclusion 
hypothesis which implies that informal wage earners are prevented from the entry into formal 
sector that offer benefits and would prefer to move there if they had the opportunity. 
Accordingly, the informal wage workers constraint are in their mobility to the formal sector in 
Egypt as we conclude in this paper. Therefore, informal employment is not a choice in Egypt 
where identical workers receive higher wages in the formal sector than in the informal and 
exclusion from formality appears to be important. 
 
In the literature earnings gap is taken as an evidence of the presence of institutional 
rigidities which may result in inequity and inefficiencies. However, it is difficult to say this in 
case of Egypt because although there are strict regulations in law there is no information on the 
extent of their enforcement and it is believed to be lacking. Therefore Egyptian labor market in 
general cannot be considered overly regulated in practice. However we can say that there is a 
large competitive informal sector in Egypt. Probably there is a more important segmentation 
along the public and private divide. Educated are known to queue for the public sector or formal 
sector jobs.  
 
Government should implement policies that will alter the cost benefit calculations of 
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sector choice by both the workers and the employers. One policy implication is that raising 
human capital levels of the poor will give them a chance to find a formal sector job and increase 
aggregate productivity of the economy. Another is that the reduction in social security 
contributions for the low skilled workers could be implemented. Formality could increase if it is 
made easier to comply with. Therefore, further reforms in addition to the 2003 Labor Law 
changes could encourage formality 
 
We believe that the informal wage penalty understates the disadvantage of the informal 
wage work. Considering the nonpecuniary advantages and disadvantages of formal and informal 
employment remains a challenge for future work. 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PRIVATE FORMAL AND PRIVATE INFORMAL 
SAMPLE BY GENDER, EGYPT, 1998-2012 
 
Male  
Wage Earner 
 
Female  
Wage Earner 
VARIABLES formal informal 
 
formal informal 
 
mean mean 
 
mean mean 
Log Hourly Wage 1.58 1.25 
 
1.62 0.85 
 
(0.63) (0.54) 
 
(0.68) (0.60) 
Weekly Hours 57.13 66.00 
 
47.42 57.42 
 
(17.59) (34.21) 
 
(10.13) (15.53) 
Age 36.10 30.24 
 
36.68 30.17 
 
(9.41) (9.70) 
 
(9.93) (9.17) 
Age Square 1391.49 1008.71 
 
1444.35 994.04 
 
(726.80) (677.46) 
 
(815.16) (640.13) 
Year of Schooling 10.52 7.67 
 
13.87 9.40 
 
(4.59) (4.28) 
 
(3.73) (5.33) 
Household Size 5.06 5.67 
 
4.47 5.10 
 
(2.47) (2.75) 
 
(1.61) (2.11) 
Marital 
     single 23.00 45.90 
 
54.00 79.90 
married 77.00 54.10 
 
46.00 20.10 
Children 
     no child 36.90 40.60 
 
64.20 66.10 
with child 63.10 59.40 
 
35.80 33.90 
Firm Size 
     1 - 4  25.00 56.40 
 
4.90 27.50 
5 - 9  6.90 22.80 
 
9.50 16.30 
10 - 24  9.40 10.60 
 
18.80 20.20 
30 - 49  8.90 4.00 
 
22.70 8.90 
50 - 99  9.60 2.80 
 
12.10 1.50 
More than 100  40.20 3.30 
 
32.00 25.60 
Sector 
     Manufacturing 43.10 27.60 
 
22.90 46.40 
Construction 5.80 28.60 
 
7.70 0.00 
Trade 13.90 21.40 
 
17.00 24.50 
Transportation 21.80 10.30 
 
2.60 0.00 
Finance and Services 15.40 12.10 
 
49.80 29.10 
Region 
     Greater. Cairo 35.80 18.50 
 
68.50 58.50 
Alexandria, Sz. C. 16.80 10.60 
 
18.30 7.70 
Urban Lower 9.10 13.50 
 
5.40 6.70 
Urban Upper 5.20 7.80 
 
1.70 5.00 
Rural Lower 22.40 29.40 
 
6.10 22.10 
34 
 
Rural Upper 10.80 20.20 
   Year 
     1998 20.40 22.40 
 
23.30 26.00 
2006 43.50 44.30 
 
44.50 42.80 
2012 36.20 33.20 
 
32.10 31.20 
      Number of Obs. 999 1977 
 
80 68 
Informal Sector (%) 33.57 66.43 
 
54.05 45.95 
Total Number of Obs. 2976 
 
148 
Total Number of ID's 1398 
 
72 
Source: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) The descriptive statistics in this table use the weighted observations which take attrition into 
account.  
2) Standard deviations are in parenthesis for the continuous variable.  
3) Log hourly wage is in Egyptian pounds real 2012 prices deflated using consumer price index. 
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FIGURE 1: Estimates of the Informal Sector Wage Penalty Alternative Estimators, Male Sample, Egypt, 
1988-2012 
 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) Panel A gives the raw informal log wage gap at the mean (solid horizontal line) and at different 
quantiles (solid curve) and the dashed lines and shaded area show the 95% confidence intervals.  Panel B, 
C and D give informal versus formal wage penalty using OLS and FE estimates (solid horizontal lines) 
and QR, FEQR and IPW-FEQR estimates (solid horizontal curves) respectively.  The dashed horizontal 
lines indicate robust 95% confidence intervals for the OLS and FE estimates. The shaded areas show the 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in the case of OR, FEQR and IPW-FEQR estimates. 
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FIGURE 2: Kernel Density Estimates of Log Hourly Wage in Formal and Informal Sector, 
Egypt, 1998, 2006 and 2012. 
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Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF ESTIMATION RESULTS: INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT WAGE GAP BY GENDER, EGYPT, 
1998-2012 
MALE 
 
 
mean 
 
  q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 
Estimation Method          
RAW WAGE GAP 
   
  
     
Informal Wage Gap  -0.273***    -0.2283*** -0.2668*** -0.2185*** -0.3117*** -0.3373*** 
OLS and QR 
 
         
Informal Wage Gap  -0.180***    -0.1826*** -0.1462*** -0.1408*** -0.1733*** -0.1996*** 
FE and FEQR 
 
         
Informal Wage Gap  -0.147***    -0.0912*** -0.1283*** -0.1604*** -0.1613*** -0.1717*** 
FEMALE 
 
 
mean 
 
  q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 
Estimation Method          
RAW WAGE GAP 
   
  
     Informal Wage Gap  -0.761***    -0.5754*** -0.7419*** -0.8274*** -0.9808*** -0.5862** 
OLS and QR 
 
         
Informal Wage Gap  -0.408***    -0.3621*** -0.3397*** -0.4697*** -0.4615** -0.8455*** 
FE and FEQR 
 
         
Informal Wage Gap  -0.552***    -0.5818*** -0.6052*** -0.5724*** -0.4173*** -0.4180*** 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes:  1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
2) OLS indicates ordinary least squares estimates. QR indicates quantile regression estimates. FE is fixed effect estimates. FEQR is the 
fixed effect quantile regression estimates. 
3) Regression coefficient on the table are based on the regressions using the variables reported in Table1 except that firm size is excluded. 
QR and FEQR regressions also do not include the firm size dummies since time-invariant factors are captured in fixed effects. 
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY RESULTS BY THE SUBSAMPLES OF TWO TIME PERIODS, AGE AND EDUCATION 1998-2012, EGYPT 
 MALE  
SUBSAMPLE OLS FE  
1998-2006    
Informal Wage Gap -0.179*** -0.0989  
Observations 1,504 1,505  
R-squared 0.222 0.323  
2006-2012    
Informal Wage Gap -0.241*** -0.188***  
Observations 2,069 2,069  
R-squared 0.189 0.134  
Age<Mean Age    
Informal Wage Gap -0.158*** -0.210***  
Observations 1,697 1,687  
R-squared 0.196 0.263  
Age>Mean Age    
Informal Wage Gap -0.188*** -0.129*  
Observations 1,277 1,276  
R-squared 0.152 0.093  
Years of Sch< Mean Years of Sch    
Informal Wage Gap -0.0332 -0.103  
Observations 1,357 1,352  
R-squared 0.192 0.161  
Years of Sch> Mean Years of Sch    
Informal Wage Gap -0.245*** -0.129*  
Observations 1,617 1,276  
R-squared 0.250 0.093  
 FEMALE  
SUBSAMPLE OLS FE  
1998-2006    
Informal Wage Gap -0.329** -0.636***  
Observations 94 94  
R-squared 0.538 0.620  
2006-2012    
Informal Wage Gap -0.528*** -0.608***  
Observations 105 105  
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R-squared 0.587 0.574  
Age<Mean Age    
Informal Wage Gap -0.540*** -0.848***  
Observations 83 82  
R-squared 0.602 0.678  
Age>Mean Age    
Informal Wage Gap -0.355 -0.464  
Observations 65 63  
R-squared 0.574 0.581  
Years of Sch< Mean Years of Sch    
Informal Wage Gap -0.422* -1.179**  
Observations 55 54  
R-squared 0.412 0.673  
Years of Sch> Mean Years of Sch    
Informal Wage Gap -0.356** -0.323**  
Observations 93 91  
R-squared 0.586 0.663  
    
Source: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
2) OLS indicates ordinary least squares estimates. FE is fixed effect estimates.  
3) The Mean Age for the male sample is 32.3, The Mean Age for the female sample is 33.8. The Mean Years of Schooling for the male sample is 8.62, The Mean 
Years of Schooling for the female sample is 11.67. 
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TABLE 4: SUMMARY RESULTS BY QUANTILES FOR THE SUBSAMPLES BY TWO TIME PERIODS, AGE AND EDUCATION 
1998-2012, EGYPT 
  MALE 
 
 
QR  FEQR 
SUBSAMPLE  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
1998-2006 
      
      
Informal Wage Gap  -0.1638*** -0.1031** -0.1451*** -0.1853*** -0.1976***  -0.1049*** -0.0989*** -0.0989*** -0.0989*** -0.0955*** 
Observations  1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504  1,505 1,505 1,505 1,505 1,505 
Pseudo R-squared  0.155 0.149 0.123 0.113 0.128  0.604 0.675 0.697 0.599 0.430 
2006-2012 
 
           
Informal Wage Gap  -0.2545*** -0.2064*** -0.1940*** -0.2284*** -0.2320***  -0.1429*** -0.1690*** -0.1884*** -0.2023*** -0.2072*** 
Observations  2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069  2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069 
Pseudo R-squared  0.130 0.129 0.107 0.093 0.106  0.180 0.234 0.290 0.238 0.189 
Age<Mean Age 
      
      
Informal Wage Gap  -0.1951*** -0.0809** -0.1068** -0.1485*** -0.1811***  -0.1694*** -0.2078*** -0.2076*** -0.2114*** -0.2169*** 
Observations  1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697  1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697 
Pseudo R-squared  0.139 0.131 0.119 0.102 0.092  0.251 0.317 0.380 0.344 0.306 
Age>Mean Age 
 
           
Informal Wage Gap  -0.1585*** -0.1994*** -0.1674*** -0.1526** -0.2472***  -0.0999*** -0.1445*** -0.1445*** -0.1442*** -0.1903*** 
Observations  1,277 1,277 1,277 1,277 1,277  1,278 1,278 1,278 1,278 1,278 
Pseudo R-squared  0.124 0.095 0.074 0.083 0.113  0.175 0.196 0.264 0.245 0.220 
Years of Sch< Mean 
Years of Sch  
           
Informal Wage Gap  -0.0929 -0.0646 -0.0431 0.0061 -0.0336  -0.0780* -0.1033*** -0.1052*** -0.1000*** -0.0803* 
Observations  1,357 1,357 1,357 1,357 1,357  1,357 1,357 1,357 1,357 1,357 
Pseudo R-squared  0.150 0.146 0.108 0.085 0.079  0.371 0.398 0.391 0.352 0.325 
Years of Sch> Mean 
Years of Sch 
            
Informal Wage Gap  -0.2168*** -0.1998*** -0.2054*** -0.1976*** -0.3021***  -0.1074*** -0.1348*** -0.1705*** -0.2030*** -0.1980*** 
Observations  1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617 1,617  1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618 
Pseudo R-squared  0.143 0.155 0.137 0.147 0.159  0.228 0.255 0.269 0.238 0.217 
  FEMALE 
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QR  FEQR 
SUBSAMPLE  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
1998-2006 
      
      
Informal Wage Gap  -0.3434* -0.2516 -0.2083 -0.2962 -0.2385  -0.6391*** -0.6329*** -0.6357*** -0.6386*** -0.6058*** 
Observations  94 94 94 94 94  94 94 94 94 94 
Pseudo R-squared  0.404 0.368 0.384 0.395 0.472  0.947 0.953 0.963 0.964 0.966 
2006-2012 
 
           
Informal Wage Gap  -0.3434* -0.2516 -0.2083 -0.2962 -0.2385  -0.5628*** -0.5938*** -0.6053*** -0.5757*** -0.6825*** 
Observations  94 94 94 94 94  105 105 105 105 105 
Pseudo R-squared  0.404 0.368 0.384 0.395 0.472  0.894 0.896 0.885 0.858 0.851 
Age<Mean Age 
     
       
Informal Wage Gap  -0.3864 -0.5235** -0.4572* -0.4711* -1.0510***  -0.9664*** -0.8648*** -0.8690*** -0.8775*** -0.9762*** 
Observations  83 83 83 83 83  83 83 83 83 83 
Pseudo R-squared   0.406 0.395 0.489 0.524  0.679 0.682 0.697 0.689 0.678 
Age>Mean Age 
 
           
Informal Wage Gap  -0.4759 -0.6056 -0.3122 -0.1560 -0.4187  -0.4058*** -0.4118*** -0.4132*** -0.4067*** -0.4524*** 
Observations  65 65 65 65 65  65 65 65 65 65 
Pseudo R-squared  0.505 0.452 0.429 0.450 0.526  0.665 0.633 0.645 0.638 0.693 
Years of Sch< Mean 
Years of Sch  
           
Informal Wage Gap  -0.3256 -0.2397 -0.4056 -0.5836 -0.6647  -0.9431*** -0.5673*** -0.6808*** -0.7320*** -0.7374*** 
Observations  55 55 55 55 55  55 55 55 55 55 
Pseudo R-squared  0.311 0.325 0.263 0.331 0.516  0.912 0.905 0.877 0.877 0.881 
Years of Sch> Mean 
Years of Sch 
            
Informal Wage Gap  -0.3454 -0.2834 -0.4215* -0.4232 -0.5021  -0.3887*** -0.3532*** -0.3434*** -0.2937*** -0.2954** 
Observations  93 93 93 93 93  93 93 93 93 93 
Pseudo R-squared  0.532 0.459 0.423 0.383 0.438  0.646 0.594 0.577 0.641 0.687 
Source: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
           2) OLS indicates ordinary least squares estimates. FE is fixed effect estimates. QR is quantile regression estimates. FEQR is fixed effect quantile estimates. 
           3) The Mean Age for the Male Sample İs 32.3, the Mean Age for the Female Sample is 33.8. The Mean Years of Schooling for the Male Sample is 8.62, 
the Mean Years of Schooling for the Female Sample is 11.67. 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A1: PROBIT ESTIMATION OF PROPENSITY TO BE IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR, BY GENDER, EGYPT, 
1998-2012 
 MALE  FEMALE 
VARIABLES PROBIT  PROBIT 
Age -0.0247***  -0.0454** 
 (0.0054)  (0.0217) 
Age2 0.0002***  0.0004 
 (0.0001)  (0.0003) 
Year of Schooling -0.0248***  -0.0353*** 
 (0.0017)  (0.0072) 
Married -0.0873***  -0.0505 
 (0.0212)  (0.0936) 
Sector    
Construction 0.3385***  0 
 (0.0234)  (0) 
Trade 0.1536***  0.0918 
 (0.0203)  (0.0977) 
Transportation -0.0733***  0 
 (0.0214)  (0) 
Finance & Services 0.0662***  0.0115 
 (0.0232)  (0.0928) 
Region    
Alexandria, Sz C. 0.0150***  -0.1297 
 (0.0236)  (0.0959) 
Urban Lower 0.1519  -0.0658 
 (0.0246)  (0.1448) 
Urban Upper 0.1166***  0.0387 
 (0.0255)  (0.1525) 
Rural Lower 0.1016***  0.0968 
 (0.0224)  (0.1218) 
Rural Upper 0.1144***  0 
 (0.0276)  (0) 
Year    
2006 0.0311  -0.0553 
 (0.0206)  (0.0882) 
2012 0.1193***  0.0354 
 (0.0218)  (0.0999) 
Wald Chi-Sq. (15 and 12) 616.57  50.82 
Pseudo R- Square 0.2375  0.2507 
Observations 2,974  142 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
2) Standart errors are in parenthesis. 
3) The dependent variable takes the value of one if informal sector and zero otherwise. 
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FIGURE A1: Kernel Density Estimates of the Propensity Scores, by Gender, Egypt, 1998-2012 
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Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
FIGURE A2: Distribution of the Proportion of Movers in and out of the Formal and Informal 
Sectors  
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Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
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TABLE A2: MINCER EARNINGS EQUATIONS, OLS, FIXED EFFECT AND FIRT 
DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES, MALE SAMPLE, EGYPT, 1998-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS FE FE FD 
       
Informal Sector -0.155*** -0.180*** -0.159*** -0.147*** -0.139*** -0.142*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0237) (0.0265) (0.0370) (0.0377) (0.0361) 
Age 0.0435*** 0.0313*** 0.0310*** 0.0472*** 0.0467*** 0.0502*** 
 (0.00628) (0.00695) (0.00695) (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0160) 
Age2 -0.000428*** -0.000297*** -0.000296*** -0.000520*** -0.000515*** -
0.000667*** 
 (8.74e-05) (9.24e-05) (9.25e-05) (0.000120) (0.000120) (0.000152) 
Years of Schooling 0.00999*** 0.0133*** 0.0124***    
 (0.00238) (0.00232) (0.00238)    
Married  0.0999*** 0.104*** 0.138*** 0.139*** 0.126*** 
  (0.0281) (0.0283) (0.0402) (0.0405) (0.0397) 
Children  -0.0328 -0.0346 -0.00940 -0.0179 -0.00794 
  (0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0346) (0.0347) (0.0387) 
Household Size  -0.00754* -0.00722* 0.00531 0.00587 0.00292 
  (0.00398) (0.00398) (0.00644) (0.00643) (0.00704) 
Firm Size       
5 - 9   0.0102  -0.0194  
   (0.0267)  (0.0333)  
10 - 24   -0.0565*  -0.0468  
   (0.0311)  (0.0413)  
30 - 49   0.0335  -0.0186  
   (0.0498)  (0.0713)  
50 - 99   -0.0454  -0.00849  
   (0.0528)  (0.0664)  
More than 100   0.0684*  0.0572  
   (0.0377)  (0.0551)  
Sector       
Construction  0.274*** 0.277*** 0.310*** 0.307*** 0.300*** 
  (0.0266) (0.0270) (0.0576) (0.0593) (0.0593) 
Trade  -0.159*** -0.154*** -0.0606 -0.0592 -0.0711 
  (0.0282) (0.0293) (0.0523) (0.0534) (0.0518) 
Transportation  0.0803*** 0.0922*** 0.133** 0.135** 0.156** 
  (0.0302) (0.0340) (0.0609) (0.0633) (0.0676) 
Finance&Services  -0.0638* -0.0608* 0.0696 0.0759 0.0827 
  (0.0343) (0.0348) (0.0529) (0.0537) (0.0569) 
Region       
Alexandria, Sz. C. -0.0927*** -0.119*** -0.121***    
 (0.0344) (0.0335) (0.0335)    
Urban Lower -0.102*** -0.117*** -0.119***    
 (0.0333) (0.0318) (0.0320)    
Urban Upper -0.158*** -0.178*** -0.179***    
 (0.0360) (0.0350) (0.0352)    
Rural Lower -0.159*** -0.178*** -0.184***    
 (0.0327) (0.0318) (0.0320)    
Rural Upper -0.00811 -0.0848** -0.0853**    
 (0.0352) (0.0363) (0.0364)    
Year       
2006 0.134*** 0.125*** 0.129*** 0.160** 0.162** 0.226*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0773) (0.0780) (0.0873) 
2012 0.162*** 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.187 0.184 0.297* 
 (0.0285) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.138) (0.140) (0.157) 
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Constant 0.443*** 0.680*** 0.669*** 0.205 0.211  
 (0.111) (0.119) (0.120) (0.289) (0.294)  
       
Observations 2,975 2,974 2,962 2,975 2,963 1,499 
Number of id    1,398 1,398  
R-squared 0.142 0.206 0.209 0.179 0.182 0.165 
Log Likelihood -2352 -2234 -2219 -947.3 -932.1 -1478 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
2) Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  
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TABLE A3: MINCER EARNINGS EQUATIONS, QUANTILE REGRESSION, MALE SAMPLE, EGYPT, 
1998-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
      
Informal Sector -0.1826*** -0.1462*** -0.1408*** -0.1733*** -0.1996*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0336) (0.0292) (0.0333) (0.0483) 
Age 0.0450*** 0.0313*** 0.0386*** 0.0243** 0.0296*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0087) (0.0077) (0.0097) (0.0107) 
Age Square -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Years of Schooling 0.0028 0.0107*** 0.0119*** 0.0166*** 0.0195*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0043) 
Married 0.0927** 0.1595*** 0.1179*** 0.0831** 0.0477 
 (0.0365) (0.0296) (0.0281) (0.0407) (0.0496) 
Children 0.0169 -0.0215 -0.0450* -0.0201 -0.0453 
 (0.0336) (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0352) (0.0356) 
Household Size -0.0022 0.0017 -0.0058 -0.0132** -0.0135* 
 (0.0068) (0.0056) (0.0051) (0.0058) (0.0070) 
Sector      
Construction 0.3951*** 0.3487*** 0.2704*** 0.2216*** 0.1458*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0382) (0.0292) (0.0378) (0.0479) 
Trade -0.1497*** -0.1713*** -0.1693*** -0.1229*** -0.1510*** 
 (0.0376) (0.0363) (0.0360) (0.0438) (0.0512) 
Transportation 0.0957* 0.1456*** 0.1163*** 0.0780* -0.0104 
 (0.0503) (0.0397) (0.0329) (0.0439) (0.0476) 
Finance&Services -0.0974** -0.0683* -0.0999*** -0.0282 0.0234 
 (0.0478) (0.0368) (0.0380) (0.0412) (0.0562) 
Region      
Alexandria, Sz. C. -0.1298*** -0.1257*** -0.0577 -0.0617 -0.0985* 
 (0.0476) (0.0378) (0.0362) (0.0444) (0.0574) 
Urban Lower -0.1307*** -0.1139*** -0.0918** -0.0941** -0.0917 
 (0.0402) (0.0358) (0.0418) (0.0397) (0.0588) 
Urban Upper -0.3331*** -0.2081*** -0.1423*** -0.1246*** -0.1202* 
 (0.0556) (0.0456) (0.0429) (0.0459) (0.0656) 
Rural Lower -0.2927*** -0.1841*** -0.1116*** -0.1045** -0.1228** 
 (0.0498) (0.0441) (0.0382) (0.0408) (0.0552) 
Rural Upper -0.2063*** -0.1193*** -0.0356 -0.0222 -0.0354 
 (0.0484) (0.0366) (0.0442) (0.0532) (0.0576) 
Year      
2006 0.1443*** 0.1009*** 0.1083*** 0.1343*** 0.1577*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0368) (0.0299) (0.0354) (0.0436) 
2012 0.1958*** 0.1512*** 0.0910** 0.1290*** 0.1469*** 
 (0.0426) (0.0423) (0.0354) (0.0395) (0.0446) 
Constant -0.0530 0.2760* 0.4957*** 1.0498*** 1.3006*** 
 (0.1968) (0.1505) (0.1308) (0.1522) (0.1842) 
      
Pseudo R-Square 0.1343 0.1355 0.1125 0.1051 0.1181 
Observations 2,974 2,974 2,974 2,974 2,974 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
2) Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis (100 replications). 
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TABLE A4: MINCER EARNINGS EQUATIONS, FIXED EFFECT QUANTILE REGRESSION, MALE 
SAMPLE, EGYPT, 1998-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
      
Informal Sector -0.0912*** -0.1283*** -0.1604*** -0.1613*** -0.1717*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0192) (0.0188) (0.0195) (0.0217) 
Age 0.0442*** 0.0445*** 0.0481*** 0.0511*** 0.0523*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0050) (0.0068) (0.0070) (0.0076) 
Age Square -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married 0.1549*** 0.2017*** 0.1620*** 0.1151*** 0.0590* 
 (0.0339) (0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0252) (0.0314) 
Children 0.0108 0.0042 -0.0220 -0.0417** 0.0035 
 (0.0243) (0.0171) (0.0167) (0.0185) (0.0277) 
Household Size 0.0000 0.0062* 0.0056* 0.0056* 0.0066 
 (0.0056) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0048) 
Sector      
Construction 0.3253*** 0.3275*** 0.3070*** 0.2809*** 0.3001*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0235) (0.0325) 
Trade -0.0963*** -0.0737*** -0.0546*** -0.0366* -0.0524* 
 (0.0354) (0.0263) (0.0202) (0.0220) (0.0272) 
Transportation 0.1365*** 0.1085*** 0.1230*** 0.1432*** 0.1771*** 
 (0.0312) (0.0202) (0.0244) (0.0292) (0.0436) 
Finance & Services 0.0446 0.0589** 0.0572** 0.0696*** 0.1001*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0274) (0.0278) (0.0254) (0.0313) 
Year      
2006 0.1274*** 0.1418*** 0.1404*** 0.1531*** 0.1796*** 
 (0.0303) (0.0254) (0.0218) (0.0207) (0.0290) 
2012 0.1542*** 0.1575*** 0.1943*** 0.1779*** 0.2409*** 
 (0.0337) (0.0281) (0.0274) (0.0201) (0.0324) 
Constant -0.1436 0.0212 0.2079** 0.3848*** 0.5131*** 
 (0.1463) (0.0866) (0.1012) (0.1221) (0.1436) 
      
Pseudo R-Square 0.2184 0.2417 0.2232 0.1948 0.1730 
Observations 2,975 2,975 2,975 2,975 2,975 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
2) Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis (100 replications). 
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TABLE A5: MINCER EARNINGS EQUATIONS, INVERSE PROBABILITY WEIGHTED FIXED EFFECT 
QUANTILE REGRESSION, MALE SAMPLE, EGYPT, 1998-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
      
Informal Sector -0.0778* -0.1403*** -0.1404*** -0.1662*** -0.1800*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0261) (0.0233) (0.0268) (0.0434) 
Age 0.0235*** 0.0286*** 0.0511*** 0.0630*** 0.0774*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0095) (0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0089) 
Age Square -0.0002 -0.0002* -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Married 0.1135** 0.1409*** 0.0446 0.0137 -0.0582 
 (0.0487) (0.0437) (0.0434) (0.0619) (0.0730) 
Children -0.1255*** -0.1052*** -0.1466*** -0.1481*** -0.1877*** 
 (0.0435) (0.0273) (0.0291) (0.0368) (0.0621) 
Household Size 0.0269*** 0.0222*** 0.0120 -0.0043 0.0018 
 (0.0095) (0.0078) (0.0083) (0.0097) (0.0093) 
Sector      
Construction 0.1393* 0.0604 0.1034 0.0659 0.1438 
 (0.0802) (0.0838) (0.0892) (0.0855) (0.1016) 
Trade -0.4974*** -0.5594*** -0.5604*** -0.5765*** -0.5517*** 
 (0.0506) (0.0276) (0.0291) (0.0383) (0.0573) 
Transportation -0.0642 -0.1049*** -0.0447 -0.0432 -0.1062** 
 (0.0581) (0.0340) (0.0320) (0.0329) (0.0534) 
Finance & Services -0.1675*** -0.1798*** -0.1793*** -0.1489*** -0.1238 
 (0.0533) (0.0298) (0.0399) (0.0447) (0.0892) 
Year      
2006 0.5515*** 0.6133*** 0.4711*** 0.5338*** 0.5084*** 
 (0.1118) (0.1092) (0.0750) (0.0725) (0.0859) 
2012 0.5450*** 0.6206*** 0.4454*** 0.4555*** 0.4063*** 
 (0.1196) (0.1245) (0.0867) (0.0726) (0.0986) 
Constant -0.2808*** -0.0501 0.0712 0.2182** 0.2234* 
 (0.1051) (0.0838) (0.0834) (0.1031) (0.1240) 
      
Pseudo R-Square 0.3738 0.4733 0.5821 0.6901 0.7734 
Observations 2,974 2,974 2,974 2,974 2,974 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
2) Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis (100 replications).  
 
